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IN THE SUPREME COURT
of the State of Utah
EARL W. WIL:SON, doing business as
Wilson's Used Car and HARTFORD
ACCIDENT AND INDEMNITY COMP ANY, a corporation,
Plaintiffs,
Case No.
719']

vs.
THE IND·USTRIAL CO·MMISSIO·N OF
UTAH, RO·BERTA BARNEY, widow,
and BEVERLY BARNEY, m in o r
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased,
n.efen~arnts.

PLAINTIFFS' REPLY BRIEF

PRELIMINARY STATEMENT
In view of the brief filed by the defendants in this
case, plaintiffs deem it necessary to file a reply brief,
touching both on matters of fact and matters of law.
In this brief we shall refer to the various parties in
the same terms as we used in our main brief.
All italics in quotations are ours, unless otherwise
noted.
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THE FACTS
We regret the necessity of treating the facts in a
reply brief. We realize the futility of engaging in a
"'tis so-' 'taint so'" argument as to what the record
reveals. But we feel that counsel has drawn some unwarranted inferences from the testimony, and so th~t
the Court may not be misled, we desire to note our exception to certain purported statements of fact in the
defendant's brief. In so doing we do not wish to he understood as inferring or implying that counsel has deliberately mis-stated the record. We think that any unwarranted inferences which may have been drawn are
the result on1y of counsel's enthusiasm in advancing the
cause which he represents.
On page 2 of defendants' brief, it is said that ''Barney was supposed to be on the job at 8 A.M., and was
to work until 5 P.M. (Tr. 10, 11, 23, 25, 28, 35, 86), leaving Barney to regulate, within those hours, his own time
and do the work most needed to be done.''And again
on p. 4, it is asserted that ''Barney, as well as all other
employees of Wilson, were supposed to be on the job
from 8:00 in the morning to 5 :00 in the evening.'' Apparently the inference intended to be conveyed by counsel is that B.arney was required to report for work at
8 :00 A.M. and to remain ''on the job'' until 5 :00 P.M.,
but that if work were slack between those hours he could
employ his time as he saw fit. Such an inference is hardly warranted by the record. Although at one point in
his testimony Wilson stated that it ''was generally unSponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

derstood he (Barney) 'Yas supposed to go to work at
eight o'clock,'' ( Tr. 25) it is clear from the record as
a whole, and particularly from the balance of Wilson's
testimony that Barney was not required to keep hard
and fast hours, and that what Wilson meant was that
ordinarily Barney came to work about 8:00 A.M. 'The
following excerpts from Wilson's testimony are salient
on this point:

"Q. . ·... did he (Barney) have regular

hours~

A. No.
Q. When did he ordilnarily go to work~
A.

About eight o'clock." (Tr. 11)

At p. 3 of their brief defendants assert that ''Barney
was supposed to be working in Sait Lake· City on that
day but was being sent to Magna to pick up an automobile. He was then to return to Salt Lake as soon as
possible with the automobile and to pick up his work
according to his assignment in Salt Lake. Barney wasn't
required or expected to report for work at Magna (Tr.
27, 28, 29), but merely, as stated above, to get the car
and then report for work in Salt Lake.''
By this statement counsel would apparently have
the Court believe that Barney was specially directed to
hustle out to ~fagna, return immediately with the automobile, and then put in a full day's shift at Wilson's
place of business in Salt Lake City. There is nothing in
the record to warrant such an inference. Whatthe record
does show is that Barney was to go out t0 Magna, and
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
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if

r1e'P~aiJrs ~on

the car w~ere not complete.d to see that such
re'parirs wer~e completed a,nd to· try to britng ,f}he C()A1 into
S~alt L~ake by·nO'on. The testimony of Wilson on this point
is as follows :
•' Q. Did you know what the status of the repairs
on that car was on that morning~
A. I do not.

Q. So you don't know of your own knowledge
whether it was ready to come back to Salt
Lake or notY
A.

No.

****
Q. So that if the car that he was supposed to
bring in for repairs was to be worked on,
that would have to be done first~

A. Yes.
****
Q. Suppose this car needed further repairs,
would he have worked on it~
A.

Either him or Mr. Foote would.

Q.

Who was in charge out there~

A. Mr. Barney was.
Q. So the work· would he done under his direction, wouldn't it Y

A.

Yes.'' ( Tr. 15-16).

And again, in respons·e to questions hy Commissioner Egan, Wilson testified as follows :

Q. Did you tell him (Barney) when to bring it
(the car) in~
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.A.. Yes, supposed to be in by Noon.
~

*~

~

Q. So far as you were concerned, it didn't n1ake
anY difference how he "Tould get it, but you
w~nted it in b~~ noon 1
A. As near as he could get it.'' (Tr. 25)
Further testimony that Barney would have worked
in Salt Lake only in the afternoon of the day of the fatal
accident, if he had not been killed is found in Tr. 27, 29.
\\-re have searched the record in vain for any testimony
to support the assertion of defendants that Barney was
expected to work all day in Salt Lake.
We also disagree with the statement on p. 3 of defendants' brief· that "It had be€n planned and was the
usual custom that Barney was to take or would have
taken his employer's wrecker to Magna to pick up this
automobile, but the wrecker was out of repair on this
particular day; therefore~ Barney was left to seek his
own transportation to Magna.''
Barney had worked for Wilson· on his contract of
employment for three days prior to the fatal accident,
and. the evidence is abundant and undisputed that Barney
had always furnished his own transportation, wherever
he had been required to go. There is not a scintil1a of
evidence in the record that Barney had ever had the
use of either the wrecker or any other vehicle owned
and used by Wilson in his business. Under these circumstances we are at a loss to understand how defendants can so blandly assert that it had, been plm!wned and
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it wa.s the US'Ual custom for Barney to take his employer's
wrecker and pick up the car in Magna.

We have taken this much time and space to point
out to the Court the difference between the facts as
stated in defendants' brief and the facts as revealed by
the record because much of defendants' argument is
based on a misconception of what the facts are. Defendants' position rests on a foundation of facts which exist
only in the imagination of counsel for defendants, and
when that unreal foundation is destroyed the argument
which rests upon it must also come toppling down.

THE LAW
There is no disagreement between counsel for the
respective parties that the single issue for the Court to
determine is whether the fatal injuries sustained by
Barney arose out of, or in the course of his employment.
vVhen we prepared our original brief we were somewhat
handicapped, since we did not and could not know what
theory would be relied upon by the defendants to support the award of the commission. We therefore found
it necessary to make a shot-gun argument. We there
treated briefly every possible theory of which we were
aware, upon which defendants might rely to sustain the
award of the Commission, and we attempted to demonstrate that none of them were applicable to the facts of
this case. Since our brief was filed, defendants have
filed a brief in which they concede the general rule: that
employees traveling to or from their employer's place
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
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of business, are not in the course of their en1ployu1ent,
and injuries sustained by en1ployees so traveling do not
arise out of or in the course of their employment, and
hence are not compensable under the \Vorkmen 's Compensation Act. Defendants rely on the special mission
or special errand doctrine (which is a well-recognized
exception to the general rule above stated) to sustain
the award of the Commission. The real and extrem·ely
narrow issue before the Court, then, is whether Barney
was engaged in a special mission for his employer at
the time- of his death. If he was, he was killed in the
course of his employment and the award of the Commission must be sustained. If not, he was not killed in
the course of his employment and the award of the Commission must be set aside. During the balance of this
brief, we shall attempt to answer the arguments advanced by defendants, and to show conclusively that at
the time he received his fatal injuries Barney was not
engaged in a special mission, but was merely enroute
to his daily work.
A.

~ARNEY

\\TAS NOT OK COMPANY TIME

WHEN HE vVAS KILLED. EVEN IF IT
BE AD!iiTTED THAT BARNEY WAS
ON COl\IP ANY TIME, DEFENDANTS'
POSITION IS NOT IMPRO·VED.
Defendants apparently rely quite heavily on the
fact that the accident occurred at 8 :15 A.M., and that
Barney ordinarily went to work at 8 :00 A.M. On p. 6 of
their brief ·they ·say: ''Had this ·accident occurred· off
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compO!YIJY hours and had Barn.ey been merely ·On his way
to do negular W·O'rk, he rno d.oub t w'ould have been in a
much miffe.rent sitwation. But we do not have, in this
case, those circumstances to contend with. Barney was
on compO!Yiry time • * * *"

The argument is transparently without merit. We
think that we have amply demonstrated, heretofore, that
Barney did not have regular hours, although he ordinarily went to work at about 8 :00 A.M., and he could
only be said to be "on company time" when he was
actually on his employer's premises or otherwise acting
in furtherance of his master's business. However, even if
it be conceded that Barney was required to commence
his daily work at 8 :00 A.M., the position of defendants
is not helped. A slovenly emp1oyee cannot, by ha.bituall~
leaving his home at the time when he is supposed to
report for work, and by thus travelling to work upon
''company time'' throw on to his employer the burden
of the risks of the road incurred by him while travelling
to and from work. It would be a monstrous rule that
would on the one hand deny the benefits of the compensation act to diligent and conscientious employees who
left their homes sufficiently nearly to arrive at their
employer's p:lace of business at the required time for
starting the day's work, and on the other hand, to permit slovenly and derelict employees to ·enjoy advantages
beyond those intended to be creruted by the L·egislature,
by reason of the fact that they left their homes late and
travelled all or part of the distance to th~eir place of work
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on ~'company tin1e .. , ,,. .e think this is so n1anifest that
there can be no need to argue the point at length, and
hence "\Ye do not labor it further.

B. B~-\.R.XEY ,,-r_.A.S XOT .:\CTING lTNDER
SPECI~\L ORDERS ...lXD HE WAS NOT
EXG...-\.GED IX ...-\. SPECIAL ~fiSSION.
HE ,,...___-\.S ~IERELY TR ...-\. \TELLING TO
,,...ORK.
\\Te have heretofore indicated that "\Ye believe that
defendants' entire argument is premised on a misconception of the facts. Defendants assume that Barney
"~as supposed to work all day in Salt Lake City on the
date of the fatal accident, and that he was specially
directed by his employer to abandon temporarily his
work in Salt Lake and go to Magna for the purpose of
bringing an automobile to Salt Lake. We submit that
the record does not justify this assumption, but we do
not concede that even if it did that the award should be
sustained.

The special mission doctrine finds its most usual
application in those cases where the employee has reported for work at his employer's place of business, and
has been directed by his superior to suspend temporarily,
the performance of his usua1 duties, and to leave the
employer's premises for the purpose of performing some
special mission or errand. The doctrine finds occasional
application in cases where an employee has been directed
to perform some service for his employer while travelling
to or from work, such as to purchase supplies or make
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deliveries. But in this latter class of cases the service to
be performed must be the principal reason for making
the trip, and not a mere incident to it. See Greer v. Ind.
Comm., 74 Ut. 379, 279 P. 900. The theory upon which
cases of the latter class rest is that the employee attaches ·himself to his day's work when he performs a
mission for his employer on the way to work, or that
he does not detach himself from his day's work until
after he has completed his employer's mission which is
to be accomplished on his way hom.e from work. Clearly
the facts of this case do not bring it within the special
mission doctrine. Barney had not yet attach~d himself
to his day's work. He was not acting in furtherance of
his master's business. So far as the record shows he
had no errands to perform, no missions to accomplish,
no purchases to make, no supplies to pick up, no finished
work to deliver, on his way from Sa:lt Lake to Magna.
He was in no sense furthering his master's business. He
was not under his master's -control. He was free to
travel by any route and by any means of conveyance
which he should choose.
In the very nature of things it was impossible for
him to attach himself to his day's work until he arrived
at Magna. As pointed out in our main brief (p. 6), it
was implicit if not explicit in Barney's instructions, that
he he certain that the repairs on the automobile were
completed before he should bring it to Salt Lake. Clearly
he could not do this until he arrived at Magna. Even if
it be conceded (which it is not), that Barney's sole duty
was to drive the car immediately back to Salt Lake, he
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could not do this, and hence could not begin his service
to his employer until he arrived at Magna and repairs
on the said car, 'Yere completed. While he was enroute
from Salt Lake to ~fagna he 'vas doing nothing morie
nor less than travelling from his home to work, the same
as Foote, ·and most other ordinary employees.
The argument of defenda~ts is conclusively answered in the reasoning of the Court in Vitagraph, Inc.,
v. Ind. Comm., 96 Ut. 190, 85 Pac. (2d) 601, wherein it
was said:
''The plant or situs· need not always or constantly be in one place. A familiar example is the
case of a mason or carpenter working for a. building contractor. He may work for a time on a
building being erected on A Street and then work
for a time on a building on B Street and then
on C Street. Each of such buildings is for the
time the plant or locus of his work, and his employee re:Zationship be:gifns when he arrives .at
his work and ends when he leaves, the situs thereof .."
That language is applicable to the facts in the case
at bar. Barney might be s.ent to Magna or Ogden or s:alt
Lake, and whereever he was sent, became~ for the time
being, his place of work. But he did not attach himself
to his work until he arrived at his employer's place of
business.
May we offer a furth~r ·example to illustrate what
we mean. Suppose John Doe is a building contractor,
and Richard Roe is a carpenter empJ.oyed by him. Doe
·dire.cts Roe to pet·form certain carpentry work on a
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house on A Street. On .Wednesday Roe completes the
work and telephones Doe to learn where he shall work
on Thursday. Doe instructs Roe to return the next day
to the house on A Street to do some additional work
and then to gather up the tools and materials and take
them over to a house on B Street, and to work on the
house on B Street on Thursday afternoon. Roe is killed
while driving from his home to the house on A Street
on Thursday morning. We think that under the facts as
given in that example Roe's dependents are not entitled
to compensation, since Roe had not yet attached himself
to his day's work. And generically the facts given in
our examp[e case are identical to the facts in the case
a;t bar.
We invite the attention of the .Court to the language
of the Supreme Court of California in Ocean Accident
& Guaranty Co. v. Ind. Acdt. Comm., 173. Cal. 313, 159
Pac. 1041 L.. R.A. 1917B, 336, and quoted with approval
by our Court in Vitagraph Inc. v. Ind. Comm., 85 Pac.
(2d) 601, 607:
'' 'In the very broadest sense, of course, it is
true that an injury which happens to a man who
is on his way to his place of employment is
an injury growing out of and incidental to his
employment,' since a necessary part of (Sic)
the employment is that the employee shall go to
and return from his place of labor. But it is to be
noted that the right tlo am ~award is (YI)Ot founded
upon 1t:he fact that the !ilnjury g'J10W'S out of arnd is
incidental to his e.mp,~oyment. It is fovunded upon
the pact that the s-ervice he is rendering at fhe
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tim~e

of the injury gr-ows out of and is inciment·al
f.o the ·employment. Therefore, an employee go-

ing to and from his place of employment is not
rendering any service, and begins to render such
service only when, as has been said, arriving at
the place of his employment, he proceeds to use
some instrumentality provided, by means of which
he immediately places himself in a position to
perform his tasks'. '' (Italics added.)

C. ANALYSIS O·F AUTH·ORITIES CITED
BY DEFENDANTS.
Defendants apparently rely strongly on Chandler
v. Ind. Comm., 60 Ut. 387, 208 P. 499. We must confess
that this case is against our position. However, we think
the case is wrongly decided. It has never been followed,
although it was cited with approval in Kahn Bros. Co.
v. Ind. Comm., 75 Ut. 145, 283 .P. 1054. An attempt was
made to distinguish the Chandler case in the la:ter case
of Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 79 Ut. 189,
8 Pac. (2d) 617. We can see no genuine difference hetween the two cases, and we think the Fidelity case impliedly overrules the Chandler ca.se. We think that the
Chandler case should be specifically overruled. The
simple facts of that case were that the emp,loyee was
bitten by a dog while walking from his home to his employer's garage for the purpose of commencing his day's
work. He had no errands or missions to perform. He was
not in any way serving the intereg;ts of his employer at
the time. So far as the statement of facts contained in
the opinion of the Court reveals, Chandler was in no
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different position than any other ~employee on his way
to work in the morning. Said the Court _at 208 Pac., page
500:
''He (Chandler) was obeying the order of his
~employer, the order to proceed to the garage for
the purpose of attending his duties there.''
The opinion fails to reveal any sound basis for the
above quoted statement. There is nothing to indicate
that Chandler's position was any different from that of
thousands of other employees in all sorts of business·es
and industries, who custom~rily report in the morning
to some branch office or out-building rather than to
their employer's main office.
And again:
''He (Chandler) was under the control and
direction of his employer from the moment he
left home to go to the garage for the automobile,
and was at that time in the course of, and within
the scope of his employment.''
Again we fail to find any basis of f~ct for the statement. The opinion does not recite any evidence that the
employer had the right to control either the route taken
by Chandler or the mode of conveyance. .Of course if
the employer did in fact have· such a right, and paid
Chandler for his time in walking from his home to the
garage, the result of the opinion is correct, and it may
be criticized only in failing to reflect adequately the
facts on which it is based.
Defendants also rely on Kahn Bros. Co. v. Ind.
Comm., 75 Ut. 145, 283 Pac. 1054. That case is a true
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example of the special mission doctrine. On its facts it
is wholly different from the case at bar. In that case
the employee was injured while returning to work from
his lunch. But in that case he had several important errands to perform for his ·employer, and those errands
were the chief reason for making the trip. The employee's going home to lunch was merely incidental to
the main purpose of his trip, which was to make calls
at several business and banking houses on behalf of his
employer. The Court recognize·d the general rule, and
also the exception to the general rule known as the
special mission doctrine, and in discussing it the Court
said:
''The mission for the employer must be the
major factor in the journey or movement and not
merely incidental thereto.''
In the case at bar there is no evidence that Barney
was engaged in any mission for his employer at all. He
had nothing to do for his employer until he arrived at
Magna. Until that time he did not become attached to
his employment.
We reiterate here, our reliance on Fidelity & Casualty Co. v. Ind. Comm., 7'9 Ut. 189, 8 Pac. (2d) 617. That
case was decided after both the Chandler and the Kahn
Bros. cases. In distinguishing those two eases the Court
speaking through Mr. Justice Elias Hansen, said:
"The facts in the case of Kahn Bros. v. Industrial Comm., supra, are readily distinguishable from the facts in the instant case. The ap·plicant in the former case was requ?Jre.d to leave
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his employer's place of business t·o ·perform erramds for his empZoy.er. While engaged in the
performance of such errands he was clearly within the protection of the Workmen's Compensation
Act. He performed an errand for his employer
before he ate lunch and was on an errand for his
employer at the time he was injured. The fact
that he ate lunch at home did not preclude him
from the protection of the Workmen's Compensation Act, because during the major part of the
time he was away from his ·employer's place of
business he was ~engaged in the furtherance of
his employer's business and was so engaged at
the time of his injury. The Chandler C.as.e tends
more nearly to support the award in the instant
case, but that cas-e does not go to the full extent
that it is necessary to go to support the award
here under review. At the time Edwim (Shufelt)
'received the imjur~e~s which canlfls,ed his death he
w:as in no sense under the control of Mis employer.
If the testimony of Mr. Peck is to be believed,
his ~employment did 1'/Aot begin wn)t~l he reached the
Semloh Hotel. The time when he was t.a ente.r
upon his employment had wot yet arrived. Under
the facts in this case w-e are rum;abne to peroeime of
amy ·re1ason W'hy the gene'rla:l role, that 1am empl,ovyee
10n his w:ay to w-ork is 'YI)Ot W'ithitn the p'tioltle~Ct~on 10'{
the morkmen's ·Comp,evns,ation Act, does wot ~ap
ply.''
'The reasoning of the Court in the above quotation
is, we think, equally applicable to the case at bar.
D·efendants have also cited a number of cases from
foreign jurisdictions. We do not think it is necessary
for this Court to go beyond the Utah cases for assistance
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eYer, since defendants have cited these cases, we set
forth below a synopsis of each case together with a statement of our reasons for believing· that the holdings of
such cases are not applicable to the facts in the case at
bar, and therefore such cases win not be of assistance
to the Court in deciding the case at bar.
It may be observed generally that nearly all of these
cases are quite old and w~ere decided when Workmen's
Compensation legislation was in its infancy in -this country, and at a time when judicial thinking on these problems had not crystallized. The C'Ourts were at that time
more or less groping their way into a new field.
JVIasStey v. Board of Ed., 204 N.C. 193, 167 SE 695.
Plaintiff was a janitor in a pub~ic school. From time to
time he was directed to make p·urchases of supplies for
the school. As a matter of convenience to himself, he
ordinarily purchased the sup·plies on his way to work in
the morning, always purchasing at the same store. One
morning while attempting to cross the street, h~e was
struck by an automobile and severely injured. He was
attempting to cross the street to go to the store for the
purpose of purchasing certain supplies which he had
been directed to purchase. Held Plaintiff was in the
course of his employment at the time he was injured.

It does not clearly app~ear from the statement of
facts contained in the opinion of the Court, whether
p;laintiff would have had to cross the street in any event
in order to get to the school where he worked, or whether
it was necessary for him to cross the street only by
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reason of the fact that he had to go to. the store. If
plaintiff crossed the street only for the reason that he
had to do so to get to the store, then the case is undoubtedly correctly decided, since under those· circumstances
he would have incurred the risks of crossing the street
solely in pursuance of his master's business. On the other
hand, if it we-re necessary for plaintiff to cross the street
regardless of the errand he was performing, then the
case would seem to be erroneously decided, since he
would have had to incur the risks of crossing the stre·et
in any event in order to reach his place of employment.
In such case, the errand would be a mere incident of his
trip, and not the prime reason therefor.
But whether rightly or wrongly decided the case
can be of little assistance to the Court in deciding the
case at bar. There is no evidence that Barney had any
errand to perform for his master on his way from Salt
Lake to Magna, nor could he have been on such errand
after he arrived at ~{agna until the car was first repaired. There is no evidence that it was repaired and
ready to go. Kyle v. Green High School, 20:8 Ia. 1037,
226 N.W. 71. P'laintiff's husband, who was school janitor,
had completed his day's work and was at home. He
was called by the school principal and asked to come
back and take care of the lights in the school gymnasium.
In response to this call he started to walk hack to the
school, and was struck and killed by an automobile. Held
Deceased was engaged in a sp~ecial mission at the time,
and his widow was entitled to compensation.
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A very similar Utah case, reaching an opposite result was Roberts v. Ind. Comm., 87 Ut. 10, 47 Pac. (2'd)
1052, cited and discussed at p. 20 of our original brief.
Roberts was called by his employer from his home in
Helper, Utah, to relieve a fellow employe,e at Soldier
Summit, Utah. While enroute from Helper to Soldier
Summit in response to said call, Roberts was killed in
an automobile accident. Held. Deceased was not at the
time of his death on a special errand for his employer.

In Re Raynes, 6,6 Ind. A. 321, 118 N.E. 387. This was
a case where a collector went to another town, on a holiday, for the purpose of collecting some of his company's
bills. He engaged a taxi to return home, and when he
alighted from the taxi he was struck by another car and
killed. Held. His injury was in the course of his employment.
The reasoning of the Court in this case is far from
satisfactory, and the basis of the Court's decision is not
clear in the opinion.

In Re Har~aden, 66 Ind. App. 298, 118 N.E. 142
and Ind. Comm. V. Aetna Life Ins. c~o., 64 Colo. 480,
174 Pac. 589 are very similar on their facts and may be
conveniently discussed together. In the Harraden case,
the plaintiff was an insurance man under the control of
his home office in Indiana, and was agent of his company in Ohio and Michigan. He was ordered by his home
office to proceed from Detroit, Mich., to Boyne City,
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tion to his hotel he slipped on the icy walks and was
injured. Held. Plaintiff was in Boyne City on express
order of his master, and therefore was in the course of
his employment at the time of his injury.
In the Aetna case, Lynch was employed by the
Walker Co., a Colorado corporation, having its principal
place of business in Denver, Colo., to act as foreman in
the construction of buildings in Colorado, Wyoming,
Idaho, Montana, Utah, Arizona and New Mexico. Lynch,
having completed his work on a building in Mton, Wyoming, was proceeding by automobile to Montpelier, Idaho
to start work on his next assignment, and was fatally injured in an automobile accident. Held. Dea;th occurred in
the course of his employment and was compensable.
In both of these cases travel was an essential part of
the ·employment itself. In both cases the injured were
where they were under specific orders from their employer. Neither case involved merely travelling from
home to work. Rather both involved travelling from one
working place to another, under express orders from the
employers.

Altman v. Kaufman Realty Co., (Pa.), 167 A. 394.
Deceased had been employed by a realty company for
a number of years and had no regular hours. He might
he called upon a.t any hour of the day or night. He was
called at a very early hour on one Saturday morning to
go supervise ·certain alterations heing made upon a
building owned by his ~employer. In response to the caH
he left his home, and was killed a short time later while
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alighting from a street car, apparently on his way to
carry out his mission. Held. Evidence sufficiently supported finding that deceased was killed in the course of
his employment.
The opinion in this case is short, and not very illuminating. Apparently the basis of the decision, was
that deceased was called at a very -early hour in the
morning, which was in the nature of a special mission.
The result is of dubious validity~ The fact that an employee is called to report for work at an unusually
·early hour would seem to be a very unsatisfactory basis
for holding that he was ·engaged in a special mission. But
whether right or wrong the case can be of no assistance
to the Court, because in the case at bar it is clear that
Barney was not called at an unusual hour, but on the
contrary was proceeding to his day's work at about the
usual tim·e.
Redme.r v. Faber & Son Co., (N.Y.) 119 N.E. 842.
Deceased was employed by Faber Co. At some time during the working day, he was sent by his employer to another factory across the str·eet to put s-ome lettering on a
trunk. On his way back to his employer's factory he
slipped on the icy street, sustaining fatal injuries. The
Court correctly held that he was in the course of his
employment at the time of the accident.

This case furnishes ·an excellent example of the
special mission doctrine. The employee had reported at
his ·employer's p1ace of business for his day's work.
He was
ordered by his employer temp1orarily to leave the
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premises and go to another factory for the purpose of
accomplishing another mission. He was in the service of
his mas·ter at the time the injury occurred. His only
reason for being on the street was the pursuance of his
master's business. The differences between that case
and ~he one at bar ar~e at once manifest, and there seems
no occasion to labor the matter further.
Milw,aukee v. Althoff, 156 Wis. 68, 145 N.W. 238.
Deceas~ed

was employed by the city, and his regular working hours were from 8:00 A.M. to 5:00 P.M. However,
he was required to report to the foreman at 7 :30 A.M.
to receive his day's instructions, and directions as to
where he should work. On~e morning, after reporting and
receiving his instructions, and while walking to his assigned place of work, he fell and sustained fatal injuries.
H.eld. Deceased was in the course of his employment at
the time he ·sustained the fatal injuries. The basis of the
court's decision was that he had come within his master's
control, and ''the relation of master and servant exists
when the servant is under the master's control and subject to his direction." On this basis the case seems correctly decided. Here again, however, the differ~ence in
facts is so great as to make the case of little help in
solving the problem at hand. For in the case at bar the
record is clear that Barney had not yet come under his
master's control.

Tnader Genwal Insuramce Co. v. Nwnley, (Tex.),
80 SW .(2d) 383. In this case compensation was allow~ed
for an employee who was injured while traveling to work
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in a conveyance furnish·ed by his master for that prurpose. The case makes no mention of the special mission
doctrine. It is based on an entirely different exception
to the general rule, discussed as rule No. 5 in our main
brief at page 16. The case can have no ap·plication to the
case at bar, since the record is clear beyond controversy
that Wilson never furnished transportation to Barney.

Reese v. Natl. Surety Co., 162 Minn. 493, 203 N.W.
442. Reese was employed by the surety company as an
adjustor. His usual place of work was the company's
office in Minneapolis ; and his usual office hours were
8 :00 A.M. to 4:30 P .~1. At times he was required to go
out of the City and attend to matters after office hours.
He was sent on a special errand which required his
presence out several miles from the office until 10
o'clock at night. He was returning to his home when injured. Held. He was in the course of his emp·loyment at
the time of his injury, since he was where his duties
called him. This case is another examptle of the special
mission doctrine. The traY.el here was inherent in, and
an essential part of the employment. Reese was in the
furtherance of his master's business at the time of the
accident. And ··h·ere again, the distinction is obvious.
Barney was in no wise serving Wilson as he was traveling to Magna. He was doing the same thing that millions
of workers do every morning-traveling to work.
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CO'NCL'USION
Plaintiffs submit that the theory upon which defendants seek to justify the award of the commission is
bas~ed upon a misconception of the facts. Barney, at the
time he was killed was doing nothing more· nor less than
traveling to his day's work. The cases cited by defendants do not support defendants' theory as related to the
facts of this case. The cas~es relied upon by plaintiffs
are good law and the principles ther,ein enumerated are
applicable to the facts of this case. Thereforie the award
of the Commission must be set aside.
Resp·ectfully submitted,

ARTHUR E. MOREiT·ON
ELIAS L. DAY
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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